SUBJECT

Title

Philosophy of Mind

Code

CCNM17-117

Type of instruction

seminar

Level

Master

Faculty

Faculty of Education and Psychology

Part of degree program

Cognitive Science MSc

Computational and Cognitive Neuroscience MSc

Credits

Recommended in

Semester 2

Typically offered in

Spring semester

Course description

The course addresses fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind such as the mind-body problem, consciousness, qualia, introspection, self-understaning/self-ignorance, and intentionality. Classic articles (e.g., by Thomas Nagel, David Rosenthal, and David Armstrong) and texts representing the research of the past decade (e.g., by Van Gulick and E. Schwitgabel) are equally used, for a balanced picture. Topics overlapping with the philosophy of cognitive science (e.g., extended mind, modularity) are also part of the course material. Overviews of the range of positions on each topic are provided by the instructor.

Learning outcome, competences
knowledge:

broad theoretical knowledge in Philosophy of Mind

attitude:

comprehensive theoretical interest

skills:

ability to form new research questions based on the new approaches

Content of the course
Topics of the course

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE SELF, SELF-KNOWLEDGE, SELF-AWARENESS

Self-knowledge/Self-ignorance
The concept of the self o Self-awareness

3. THE MIND, THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY

The mind-body problem
Folk psychology
Mental causation

4. CONSCIOUSNESS, QUALIA, INTENTIONALITY

Consciousness
Qualia
Intentionality

5. BELIEF AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION

Belief
Mental time travel

Learning activities, learning methods: Lectures and interactive discussions

Evaluation of outcomes Learning requirements, mode of evaluation, criteria of evaluation:
requirements

reading the texts along the way
participation in the discussion
presentation

mode of evaluation: oral exam and practical course mark

Readings

Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review 83(4), 435-450 or Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal Questions (pp. 166-181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical studies, 49(3), 329-359.
Van Gulick, R. (2004). Higher-order global states (HOGS) An alternative higher-order model. In: R. J. Gennaro (Ed.), Higher-order theories of consciousness: An anthology (pp. 67-92). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pulishing Co.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32, 127–136.
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78, 67–90.
Armstrong, D. M. (1963). Is introspective knowledge incorrigible? Philosophical Review 72, 417–432.
Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). Self-unconsciousness. In: J. L. Liu, & J. Perry (Eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays (pp. 1-23). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roessler, J. (2003). Intentional action and self-awareness. In: J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (pp. 383-406). New York: Oxford University.
Crane, T. (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. In: Q. Smith and A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (pp. 33-56), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In Chalmers, D. (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings (pp. 520-532). New York: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7-19.
Carruthers, P. (2005). The case for massively modular models of mind. Contemporary debates in cognitive science, 205-225.