Philosophy of Mind
The course addresses fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind such as the mind-body problem, consciousness, qualia, introspection, self-understaning/self-ignorance, and intentionality. Classic articles (e.g., by Thomas Nagel, David Rosenthal, and David Armstrong) and texts representing the research of the past decade (e.g., by Van Gulick and E. Schwitgabel) are equally used, for a balanced picture. Topics overlapping with the philosophy of cognitive science (e.g., extended mind, modularity) are also part of the course material. Overviews of the range of positions on each topic are provided by the instructor.
Learning outcome, competences
- broad theoretical knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
- comprehensive theoretical interest
- ability to form new research questions based on the new approaches
Content of the course
Topics of the course
2. THE SELF, SELF-KNOWLEDGE, SELF-AWARENESS
- The concept of the self o Self-awareness
3. THE MIND, THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
- The mind-body problem
- Folk psychology
- Mental causation
4. CONSCIOUSNESS, QUALIA, INTENTIONALITY
5. BELIEF AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION
- Mental time travel
Learning activities, learning methods: Lectures and interactive discussions
Evaluation of outcomes Learning requirements, mode of evaluation, criteria of evaluation:
- reading the texts along the way
- participation in the discussion
mode of evaluation: oral exam and practical course mark
Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review 83(4), 435-450 or Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal Questions (pp. 166-181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical studies, 49(3), 329-359.
Van Gulick, R. (2004). Higher-order global states (HOGS) An alternative higher-order model. In: R. J. Gennaro (Ed.), Higher-order theories of consciousness: An anthology (pp. 67-92). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pulishing Co.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32, 127–136.
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78, 67–90.
Armstrong, D. M. (1963). Is introspective knowledge incorrigible? Philosophical Review 72, 417–432.
Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). Self-unconsciousness. In: J. L. Liu, & J. Perry (Eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays (pp. 1-23). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roessler, J. (2003). Intentional action and self-awareness. In: J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (pp. 383-406). New York: Oxford University.
Crane, T. (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. In: Q. Smith and A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (pp. 33-56), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In Chalmers, D. (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings (pp. 520-532). New York: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7-19.
Carruthers, P. (2005). The case for massively modular models of mind. Contemporary debates in cognitive science, 205-225.